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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 8, 1972

SUBJECT:

Location of SALT II

PARTICIPANTS:

Yuly M. Vorontsov,

Minister Counselor,

USSR

Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA

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AmEmb Moscow

I called Vorontsov August 7 to make sure that my communication of August 4 to Ambassador Dobrynin had been understood, and repeated the substance of it.

I explained that I had called his Ambassador Friday rather than waiting until today to pursue the matter in view of the urgency for us of proceeding with a search for suitable facilities in Geneva; I reminded him that our administrative officer is now in Geneva for this purpose. Vorontsov suggested the desirability of a coordinated approach to the Swiss Government. I said that, because of our administrative problems, we had already informed the Swiss of the agreement of the US and the USSR to move SALT II to Geneva if possible, so that we would be in a position to start the search for facilities. Vorontsov volunteered that they did not have a similar problem, since they had a new building in Geneva providing them ample space and facilities. I suggested that he might ask his Government to make known to the Swiss that he might ask his Government to make known to the Swiss authorities, in Moscow or Bern, that they were in agreement with us on the preference for Geneva as a site for SALT II. He agreed to do this and asked whether we needed a common meeting place.

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I said I thought this was not desirable; as at Helsinki and Vienna, the two delegations could simply alternate meetings in the conference rooms of each side. Vorontsov thought this was sensible and observed that the Soviet Mission in Geneva had a suitable conference room for this purpose.

I noted that, once it was clear the Swiss had no problem with Geneva as a site, we would want to notify the Finns and Austrians of the change, which we had not yet done. He suggested that this be done in concert or parallel, and I said I thought this was reasonable.

I reminded him again that we reserved the possibility that the first session of SALT II might be at Vienna, since we did not yet know whether we could be ready to operate in Geneva if the first session were to come, for example, in October.

After a vain effort to reach Vorontsov again late August 7, I spoke to him about 10:00 AM August 8. I explained that the desirable schedule was now becoming clearer. We expected a favorable answer from the Swiss on the morning of Wednesday, August 9. By then, enough people in the Swiss Government and elsewhere would know of the prospective change of site so that a leak to the press became increasingly likely with the passage of time. We thereforewanted to go to the Finns and Austrians as soon as possible on receiving the green light from the Swiss. We hoped this could be on Wednesday or Thursday if the Soviets were agreeable. It would then be possible to have a press announcement on Friday, August 11. I said that we would be preparing a paper containing what we would envisage saying to the press, and would try to have it in his hands by the end of the day today. I asked whether he had any sense of how Moscow felt about all this.

Vorontsov said he had no difficulty with the general sequence. He repeated that the USSR side wanted to handle the matter in concert with us. Timing was the principal problem: it was already nearly the end of the work day in Moscow.

Therefore, even if he sent off a proposed scenario promptly today, he could not be sure of an answer before Thursday morning. He thought we might have to settle for a schedule involving notice to the Finns and Austrians on Friday and a press

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announcement on Saturday. I said that this left us too much at the mercy of press leaks. If Wednesday was too soon for notice to the Finns and Austrians, we ought at least to try to tell them on Thursday so that the press announcement could come on Friday.

Vorontsov asked whether we envisaged identical approaches to the Finns and Austrians or parallel ones. I said I thought a parallel approach would be sufficient and repeated the points Garthoff had originally made to him, i.e., that the U.S. and Soviet Governments were very pleased with the working conditions and hospitality at Helsinki and Vienna, but believed that over the indefinite duration of SALT II it would be highly preferable on financial and administrative grounds to have a single site. Geneva had been mutually agreed as a convenient one. Vorontsov asked if we could provide him with a brief outline of the points to be made which he could send to Moscow to ensure that we did take a similar line. I agreed to try to do this and he said Yereskovski would be available to pick up it and a proposed outline of a press announcement as soon as ready.

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